The Lord Bishop of Winchester: My Lords, many of those most involved in these questions would hear the Minister's response with the sheerest incredulity. I wonder how she explains the adjudications that I have read, which those working in the field assure me are quite typical, that suggest that those responsible have no conception of the lack of any order and of the unpredictable cruelty and/or lack of discipline of whatever officials, police or military there may be? That suggests that those responsible have not read any of the documentation that she mentioned. I have sought to read much of it in particular cases, and it flies utterly contrary to the view of the adjudications. Does the noble Baroness agree with me that during the past 10 years, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, for example, have not been the peaceful, predictable, English suburban kind of places that adjudications seem to imagine are the places from which those people have come?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, the right reverend Prelate's suggestion is far-reaching. It is critical that immigration judges receive ongoing training, which they do, that they understand refugee law, which they do, and that they understand diversity issues, which are critical. They make decisions based on the evidence before them, apply the law to the facts as they find them and rely on case law. They take seriously allegations of violence, torture or rape that are put before them.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre has already commenced planning for Pentameter 2. Although the precise scope, timeframe and scale of the operation has not yet been finalised, it is intended that it will take place during 2007.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, Section 41 of the Kenyan constitution grants the president exclusive rights to appoint commissioners to the Electoral Commission of Kenya. However, in the interests of a sound electoral process, it is essential that the Electoral Commission be perceived as independent and impartial by the Kenyan electorate. We, along with our EU partners, stressed the importance of this to Foreign Minister Tuju on 18 January. We will continue to make these points to the Kenyan Government.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, is not the failure of the Government of Kenya to tackle the Anglo Leasing scandal, and the appointment of the nine new members of the Electoral Commission without regard to political balance and without consultation, evidence that the new Government have disappointed all those who supported its dismissal? Furthermore, were these matters raised by the Commonwealth Secretary-General on his recent visit when he said that the secretariat's involvement with Kenya was intense, and could the secretariat play any part in mediating between the Government and the opposition to sort these matters out to the satisfaction of the public?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 2 to 4. Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 are designed to ensure that the guarantee of judicial independence set out in Clause 1 includes all the tribunals which are administered by the Lord Chancellor. As it currently stands, the guarantee in the Bill does not cover the employment tribunals in Scotland, nor does it cover the Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel adjudicators appointed by Scottish Ministers under Section 5 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995. These are the only tribunals administered by the Lord Chancellor that fall outside Schedule 14 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. A further difficulty is that members of employment tribunals are not within Schedule 14 to the 2005 Act and so do not come within the guarantee in Clause 1 if they are not chairmen. These would be unfortunate anomalies if they were not remedied, and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 do so.
	Amendments Nos. 3 and 4 amend Clauses 4 and 5 in order to clarify which legally qualified members of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal are to be considered judges of a first tier tribunal and which are to be considered judges of the upper tribunal. As presently drafted, the Bill provides that all legally qualified members should be considered judges of the upper tribunal. The Government's intention, which was reflected in the Bill that we published in draft last July, is that only the president or deputy president or a senior immigration judge would sit as a judge of the upper tribunal. All other AIT judges are to be part of the first tier tribunal only.
	In the process of redrafting the Bill for introduction in Lordships' House, that visible distinction was lost, although the practical effect would have been no different. These amendments revert to what was contained in the draft Bill and provide clarity on the face of the Bill in respect of the AIT and the mapping of judicial office holders into the appropriate tier. I should add that the amendments do not in any way change the position of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, which remains outside the first tier and upper tribunal and will remain so unless and until the Home Secretary agrees to its transfer into the new tribunal structure. I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, this amendment raises the question of the scope of an appeal from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal. The answer given by the Minister when the matter was raised in Grand Committee by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart was that judicial review would cover the need to appeal on the basis of an unreasonable finding on the facts. Now that is coupled with a resistance to the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, on the basis that too much judicial review is likely to arise, and therefore it has to be delegated back down to the upper tier tribunal.
	Another fear that the Minister expressed in Grand Committee was that if the upper tribunal were able to hear an appeal on fact, or on points of law and fact, it would become a simple two-tier process whereby people who were turned down by the first-tier tribunal would simply take their case upwards to the upper tribunal. However, our amendment is subject to the granting of leave. Amendments Nos. 8 and 9, which are linked with Amendment no. 7, are in place in order to deal with that very problem, so that it would not be possible for a dissatisfied claimant to appeal from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal on an issue of fact by right as a matter of course. He would have to get consent from the upper tribunal itself.
	Amendment No. 8 refers to the provision where leave must be granted at the moment, but we suggest leave must be granted for an appeal under subsection (1)(a)—that is, on any point of law—or (1)(c), on points of law and fact, either from the first-tier tribunal itself or from the upper tribunal.
	However, our Amendment No. 9 makes it quite clear that an appeal on issues of fact could be decided only by the upper tribunal, so a considerable filter is built into the amendment which would make it possible for appeals which involve issues of fact to be heard by the upper tribunal only where there was a real concern and a possibility that the factual findings of the first-tier tribunal were flawed.
	We are seeking to lift from the High Court the weight of too many judicial review proceedings. This is an appropriate way of doing it. It is subject to a considerable filter. Within a short time, the upper tribunal would have put in place principles whereby appeals involving findings of fact would be considered by it. It would obviously be only a small proportion of the cases. It is appropriate when we are dealing with what is supposed to be an informal hearing that the first-tier tribunal should not be the final arbiter on issues of fact. I beg to move.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, my diplomatic approach is to try to agree with everybody, on the grounds the more that we can have "law by consensus", which is a phrase that I heard yesterday evening, the better we all will be.
	I thought carefully about the amendment. We consulted widely across government on its impact, because I know that the noble Lord quite reasonably took my words from Committee and sought to develop the filter system. I therefore took the time and trouble to pass the amendment right across government to get their views.
	I cannot accept the amendment, but I want to explain why, because it is important that it is understood why, when we looked at the possible implications, there were genuine concerns. Although the noble Lord may not agree with them, I hope that he will accept them as such.
	We have tried to make the tribunal system that is proposed in the Bill as simple and as straightforward as possible. It includes the full right to appeal on fact, law and other relevant bases to the independent and expert tribunal. That gives a reasoned decision. There is a further right of appeal to the upper tribunal if there has been a mistake about the law. My fear is that the amendments could unintentionally undermine both tribunals, because there would not necessarily be finality about any aspect of the first-tier tribunal's decision, and the upper tribunal, we fear, would be inundated. We cannot estimate the number of applications that the prospect of appeal on the facts might generate but, for instance, there are about 250,000 social security and child support appeals each year. There is a right to apply for leave to appeal on a point of law to the Social Security Commissioners but there are about 4,000 applications a year, so that is less than 2 per cent of the total. Where there is a right of appeal on facts there are no constraints to the number of applications; each appellant can make an application for permission purely because they are unhappy with the decision against them.
	The noble Lord's answer to this is to maintain the permission requirement and to restrict the power to grant permission on questions of fact to the upper tribunal. I understand that but I am not sure that it would not result in a complex and potentially cumbersome system, quite apart from the potential intolerable increase in the number of applications. We must recognise that that could be the case. The noble Lord is a lawyer and I am not, but lawyers talk about distinctions between fact and law not always being completely clear. Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that applicants could raise questions both of fact and law. The first-tier tribunal can decide only if there is a point of law or a mixture of law and fact, and so if it decides neither is the case, the application will have to go on to the upper tribunal. We could end up with two bites of the cherry becoming the norm. Although the effect might be to filter out those cases that should not be heard, we would have to address the real practical implications of the process. Dealing with the applications themselves and whether they would fulfil the criteria for onward appeal could be a huge undertaking for the tribunals and the decision-making department.
	Of course, volume alone should not be a reason to bar change but we believe that we have a proportionate system of appeals. Having consulted very widely, we believe that we have adequate means of redress for appellants without this amendment. For that reason, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw it.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 10, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 11, 12, 13 and part of Amendment No. 17.
	It might be helpful to the House if I try to put these amendments into context. That means starting with Clause 13, which provides for an appeal from the upper tribunal to the Court of Appeal, but only on a question of law and only with leave. Like many other clauses, Clause 13 is pretty complex. As so often, subsection (1) gives with one hand and subsections (6) and (8)(f) enable the Lord Chancellor to take away with the other hand. But in general, Clause 13 follows well trodden ground.
	Clause 15, on the other hand, is something entirely new. It confers on the upper tribunal a power to hear applications for judicial review. That has never happened before. That in itself should not be a reason why it should not happen now but it is surely a good reason why we should tread somewhat carefully.
	Hitherto, the power to grant judicial review has been confined to the High Court. One can see that from the very fact that Clause 15 puts "judicial review" in inverted commas. It is not ordinary judicial review as we know it. Again, one can see it from subsection (3), which says that relief granted by the tribunal shall have the same effect as if it had been granted by the High Court. A similar reference to the High Court is in subsection (3)(b) and subsections (4) and (5). They refer always to the High Court, not to the county court. The reason is quite simple; the county court does not have, and never has had, a power to grant judicial review. The explanation for that, as so often, is partly historical; the power of the High Court to grant judicial review, which was then called by a different name, existed for many generations before the county court even came into existence.
	One may then ask why it is that judicial review has never been extended to the county courts or to other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. Why has it never been extended to tribunals? The reason is that judicial review is the means by which the individual citizen can challenge the decisions of government departments and other public bodies. Such applications are often very high profile. One thinks of applications to challenge the Government's anti-terrorist legislation, and many other applications of that kind. It is important that such very high profile applications should be heard by judges of the highest standing and the longest experience; and by judges who cannot be removed save by a Motion of both Houses of Parliament. Such judges exist in the administrative court, as we have it today; the names of Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Sullivan stand out as judges who have played a very important role in that capacity. Because these are high profile cases, the judges often find themselves subject to attack. One remembers how Mr Justice Collins was attacked by Mr Blunkett when he was Home Secretary. Not all applications for judicial review are high profile; some, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has pointed out, are fairly rubbishy, but these are weeded out at an early stage, because you can only apply for judicial review if you already have leave.
	On the amendment, I am in favour of extending judicial review to the upper tribunal—it would have very many advantages—but I would only be in favour on one condition; that the judge presiding at the hearing for judicial review by the upper tribunal should be a High Court judge. He would gain much from having the expertise of his fellow members on the tribunal, and the Employment Appeal Tribunal would provide a useful precedent for that. He would provide the authority and experience that go with the office of High Court judge. That is of particular importance at the early stages of this new experiment, which I strongly support. I venture to suggest that an important principle lies behind the amendment and that the principle is worth fighting for.
	However, the last thing we want to do is to make life more difficult for the Lord Chief Justice. I spoke to him this morning. He pointed out that it was his responsibility under the Constitutional Reform Act to deploy the judges as he thought best. That must be right and one readily accepts that. He also pointed out that there might be circumstances in which he simply did not have a High Court judge available to hear an application for judicial review. I am sure that the House will not seek to tie his hands. He said that he needed some flexibility and I am sure that we can all understand that.
	It occurs to me that we can meet his needs by inserting in the amendment words such as, "unless the Lord Chief Justice directs otherwise in a particular case". We cannot alter the amendment today, but if the Minister were to indicate that she would seek a solution along those lines and perhaps bring the matter back at Third Reading, I would not wish to press my amendment to a vote today. Meanwhile, I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, we on these Benches strongly support the principle that lies behind the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. We note that he wishes to add some words and perhaps we can reach the consensus to which the noble Baroness referred a short while ago. The principle is absolutely fundamental. It is a bulwark of our constitution—although that may be a hackneyed phrase—that we have the High Court to check government through the judicial review process. In no other sort of case is there such a direct clash between the Government and the court, which acts to protect the individual.
	It would be wrong to weaken that principle in any way, simply because we are seeking to extend the jurisdiction of the courts by this tribunals Bill—we are trying to increase the profiles of tribunals in an important way and to have a rational consensus as to how they should work. But it would be wrong to allow the principle that has lasted a thousand, or at least very many, years to be weakened with a Bill such as this. The names of the prerogative writs—certiorari, mandamus and the rest of them—are absolutely fundamental to our law. I look forward to hearing what the noble and learned Lord can agree with the noble Baroness or, if they cannot agree, to seeing what he brings forward at Third Reading, when he will have our support.

Lord Clinton-Davis: My Lords, I agree with what has just been said. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has made a powerful case and the amendment that he suggests, which is not before us at the moment, would also be practical. I hope that my noble friend will accept the suggested amendment. If she cannot, she will need to put forward a case that would appeal to many of us. At the moment, the suggestion that has been made to the House is compelling—and that is not a party point of view in any way. I hope she will recognise that this matter is very important in terms of practicality and would add to the reputation of the court—a point that I hope will not be forgotten in this context.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I find myself in complete agreement with all the previous speakers on this amendment. There is an important distinction between High Court judges and all other judges, a distinction that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, brought out in his speech. High Court judges can be dismissed only on an address of both Houses of Parliament; whereas all other judges can be dismissed by decision of the Lord Chancellor in conjunction with the Lord Chief Justice. So the constitutional status of High Court judges is very different from the status of other judges. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, rightly said, it is increasingly, and lamentably, the case that judges are criticised by politicians. They need the robust protection that High Court judges have under our constitution.
	It was particularly interesting in listening to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, to learn that the Lord Chief Justice's concerns are not constitutional ones. It appears that he absolutely accepts the importance of High Court judges hearing judicial review matters. His concerns are matters of practicality. There may be circumstances in which there are simply not sufficient High Court judges to serve the needs of the upper tribunal; therefore, he is seeking some flexibility in that respect. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who rightly feels so strongly about this, nevertheless has to take that concern into account in deciding what to do about his amendment. I am completely at one with the noble and learned Lord and he will have our support from these Benches.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, in responding to what the noble Baroness said a few moments ago I remind myself of what was said at Second Reading. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, raised the question of legal aid at the beginning of the Lord Chancellor's introductory speech. He said that he was concerned that legal aid would not be available. The noble Baroness has quoted the Lord Chancellor's response, but I shall repeat it. He said,
	"I am supportive of the proposition that, for issues such as welfare benefit, legal aid should be more widely available than it is at the moment".—[Official Report, 29/11/06; col. 762.]
	Nothing could be vaguer than that. I do not regard it as a commitment for the future. It is limited to issues such as welfare benefit; and "more widely available" could mean anything. For that reason I seek to obtain the opinion of the House on this issue. I beg to move.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, Amendment No. 24 is a minor drafting amendment to clarify the provisions on costs in Clause 28, which grants the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal the power to order costs and expenses, which are the Scottish equivalent, in the same way as the courts, but makes this subject to tribunal procedure rules. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan of Rogart, who is not in his place at the moment, for his intervention on Clause 28 and Schedule 5 at Second Reading. The Child Poverty Action Group has also expressed concern that the clause might call into question the ability of the Tribunal Procedure Committee to makes rules that offered exemptions from the general power to award costs. The Government never intended the cost provisions to apply to all the functions exercised by the first-tier or upper tribunals. The provisions are intended to provide flexibility so that cost regimes can develop in tandem with their associated jurisdiction. I beg to move.

Lord Goodlad: My Lords, this new clause has something of a history. It first appeared as Clause 23 in the first draft of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill, as originally published by the Government. To call it a new clause may be something of a misnomer. The Constitution Select Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member, said in its report on the Bill to your Lordships' House, dated 11 December 2006, that we saw merit in Clause 23 of the draft Bill, unlike the Bill before your Lordships today which contains only a cursory—the Select Committee said "a terse"—and passing reference to alternative dispute resolution techniques.
	This new clause provides a clear, statutory basis for the use of mediation and guarantees for citizens against undue pressure to use ADR rather than seek access to justice more formally at a tribunal hearing. When challenges are made to the merits or lawfulness of a public authority's decision, there is often a considerable imbalance of power between the parties. The Select Committee therefore came to the view that ADR should take place in a proper legal and constitutional framework.
	I have some, but not much, sympathy with the view that this clause is not wholly necessary. When the Government introduce legislation to create a major new scheme and establish important public authorities, the provisions of the legislation ought to reflect the Government's underlying policy goals. If a Bill fails to do this, Parliament is denied the opportunity to scrutinise the policy during its passage through Parliament. The omission from the Bill of a clause dealing fully with mediation would create a significant mismatch between the legislative scheme put before Parliament and the Government's avowed policy goals in establishing the new tribunal system.
	The Select Committee did not share the Government's confidence that tribunal members and their staff, like their counterparts in the courts, do not need express statutory power to mediate disputes; our lack of confidence being based on broad constitutional principle and a view of the law as it is. Superior courts, such as the High Court of England and Wales, have an inherent jurisdiction—powers derived from common law rather than statute. However, the position of tribunals is far from settled. Even if it is accepted that tribunals have such inherent jurisdiction and powers, their scope is far from certain.
	The broad constitutional question is whether public authorities established by Act of Parliament should derive their principle powers from express legal provisions. Mr Justice Laws, as he then was, in his judgment in 1995 in the case of R v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings answered that question in the affirmative. He said that,
	"the freedoms of the private citizen are not conditional upon some distinct and affirmative justification for which [we] must burrow in the law books. Such a notion would be anathema to our English legal traditions. But for public bodies the rule is opposite, and of another character altogether. It is that any action to be taken must be justified by positive law. A public body has no heritage of legal rights which it enjoys for its own sake; at every turn, all of its dealings constitute the fulfilment of duties which it owes to others; indeed, it exists for no other purpose ... Under our law, this is true of every public body. The rule is necessary in order to protect people from arbitrary interference by those set in power over them".
	I submit that if the new tribunal system is to engage in the widespread use of ADR, it should be done on the basis of express legal authority contained in primary legislation.
	Access to justice is a principle of the British constitution. The new clause we are debating provides some assurance that appellants who are often vulnerable by reason of poverty, of age or of ill health, will not be or feel pressurised by officials into using ADR when what they seek is a hearing before an independent tribunal judge.
	The Department for Constitutional Affairs has made it clear in a number of ministerial speeches, and in the White Paper Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals, that it wishes to see ADR used on a very large scale in the new tribunal system to be created by this Bill. Anyone reading the Bill would find it hard to see where this major change in policy is reflected in the legislation. The Bill in its present form does not refer to this shift in the relationship between citizens and tribunals save for the requirement placed on the senior president of tribunals, the senior judicial figure responsible for leadership in this field, to have regard to the need to develop innovative methods for resolving disputes that are of a type which may be brought before tribunals.
	In terms of parliamentary accountability and legal authority, I do not believe that that is nearly adequate. This new clause emphatically does not, as the Government may have feared, seek to instruct tribunals on what they should or should not do; rather, it enacts basic constitutional protections for aggrieved citizens against the risk of oppression or unfair requirements to use ADR. For those noble Lords in this House—and I suspect that this involves nearly all of us—who believe that ADR will be a useful method of resolving disputes between parties who might otherwise have to resort to formal litigation, this new clause represents an important safeguard. Some may argue that the new clause unnecessarily employs both belt and braces. However that may be, I would prefer that the new tribunals should enter the world wearing both belt and braces rather than neither. I beg to move.

Lord Newton of Braintree: My Lords, I rise briefly to support the general thrust of my noble friend's remarks. The background from my point of view is slightly ironic. I too had noticed this and discussed it with the Minister. I told her that I was minded to put down the clause from the draft Bill today only to be told that my noble friend had got in ahead of me. I am happy, as it were, to hitch my wagon to his, with thanks to him.
	I had noticed the disappearance of this clause, but I also have some sympathy with the point that it may not be needed strictly in terms of what you can or cannot do. Without doing quite as much constitutional heavy breathing as my noble friend, I see some merit in running up this particular flag as part of the legislation—or something like it—not least because of the point he made about the policy goals and the advantage perhaps for the development of the approach. I am not going to comment on whether the detail is right. I know that some members on the Council on Tribunals were concerned about the omission of the clause. Some also have concerns about whether it may not be too restrictive or need some refinement in detail. I do not want to enter into that, but I hope that in general terms—

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 26:
	Clause 29 , page 23, line 9, at end insert—
	"(aa) functions of the Consumer Credit Appeals Tribunal,"

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 27:
	After Clause 32 , insert the following new Clause—
	"Power to provide for appeal to Upper Tribunal from tribunals in Northern Ireland
	(1) Subsection (2) applies if—
	(a) a function is transferred under section 29(1)(a), (c), (d) or (e) in relation to England (whether or not also in relation to Wales) but is not transferred under section 29(1) in relation to Northern Ireland, (b) an appeal may be made to the Upper Tribunal against any decision, or any decision of a particular description, made in exercising the transferred function in relation to England, and (c) no appeal may be made against a corresponding decision made in exercising the function in relation to Northern Ireland.
	(2) The Lord Chancellor may by order provide for an appeal against any such corresponding decision to be made to the Upper Tribunal.
	(3) An order under subsection (2)—
	(a) may include provision for the purposes of or in consequence of, or for giving full effect to, provision made by the order; (b) may include such incidental, supplemental, transitional or consequential provision or savings as the Lord Chancellor thinks fit.
	(4) An order under subsection (2) does not cease to have effect, and power to vary or revoke the order does not cease to be exercisable, just because either or each of the conditions in subsection (1)(b) and (c) ceases to be satisfied in relation to the function and decisions concerned."

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendments Nos. 28 and 29:
	Clause 33 , page 26, line 42, leave out "subsection (1)" and insert "this section"
	Clause 33 , page 27, line 14, at end insert—
	"( ) Subsection (4) does not apply to any relevant function of the Secretary of State—
	(a) under section 41 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c. 39) (appeals), or (b) under section 7 of the Estate Agents Act 1979 (c. 38) (appeals)."
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 34 [Transfer of powers to make procedural rules for certain tribunals]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 30:
	Clause 34 , page 28, line 11, at end insert—
	"( ) Subsection (2) does not apply to—
	(a) power conferred by section 40A(3) or 41(2) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c. 39) (power to make provision with respect to appeals), or (b) power conferred by section 7(3) of the Estate Agents Act 1979 (c. 38) (duty of Secretary of State to make regulations with respect to appeals under section 7(1) of that Act)."
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Clause 35 [Power to amend lists of tribunals in Schedule 6]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 31:
	Clause 35 , page 29, line 9, leave out "on or before" and insert "after"
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	Schedule 7 [Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council]:

Lord Kingsland: moved Amendment No. 32:
	Schedule 7 , page 141, line 37, leave out ", or without cause"

Lord Kingsland: moved Amendments Nos. 33 to 35:
	Schedule 7 , page 142, line 29, leave out ", or without cause"
	Schedule 7 , page 143, line 16, leave out ", or without cause"
	Schedule 7 , page 143, line 34, leave out paragraph 11
	On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, I make a formal objection to the use of the expression,
	"territory for England and Wales".
	I do not think that is appropriate and I do not wish it to be a precedent to appear in any future legislation.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendments Nos. 37 to 39:
	Schedule 8 , page 159, leave out lines 33 and 34 and insert "members of panels of members of employment tribunals (in their capacities as members of such panels, whether or not panels of chairmen)."
	Schedule 8 , page 163, line 29, leave out from "of" to end of line 33 and insert "judges, and other members, of the Appeal Tribunal (in their capacities as members of the Appeal Tribunal)."
	Schedule 8 , page 169, line 46, leave out "legally qualified"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 46 [Orders and regulations under Part 1: supplemental and procedural provisions]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendments Nos. 40 and 41:
	Clause 46 , page 34, line 21, after "32," insert "(Power to provide for appeal to Upper Tribunal from tribunals in Northern Ireland),"
	Clause 46 , page 34, line 38, leave out from "Part," to end of line 42
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 47 [Judicial appointments: "judicial-appointment eligibility condition"]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 42:
	Clause 47 , page 35, line 40, at end insert—
	"( ) At any time before the coming into force of section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (renaming of Supreme Court), the reference to the Senior Courts in subsection (5) is to be read as a reference to the Supreme Court."

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 42, I will speak to Amendments Nos. 43 to 55, 94 and 95. It is a rather large group of amendments, but it has been because they are extremely minor and technical, and they fit together very well. I hope that noble Lords will bear with me in allowing me to speak to them together.
	Amendments Nos. 42, 55, 47, 50 and 53 are simply transitional provisions for references to the senior courts to be read as the Supreme Court until Section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Chapter 4, on the renaming of the Supreme Court, comes into force. The amendments ensure that the courts are correctly described for the purposes of the legislation. Their omission from the Bill was an oversight, which the amendments seek to correct.
	Amendments Nos. 94 and 95 are standard amendments, which protect the Lord Chancellor's functions in relation to appointments made under the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 and the Social Security Act 1998. This means that those functions cannot be transferred to another person simply by order. The amendments correct an earlier omission from Schedule 7 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which has only recently been identified.
	Amendments Nos. 43 to 46 and 52 are minor amendments concerning certain judicial offices in the London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 and the Social Security Act 1998. First, the amendments ensure consistency with other provisions in the Bill in relation to when a person qualifies as a barrister. Secondly, they extend the Lord Chancellor's order-making powers, so that those powers will apply not only to the office of nominee under the 1939 Act, but also to the office of nominee's deputy. Thirdly, they make minor drafting amendments identified by parliamentary counsel. They are technical amendments, which are being laid at this stage to ensure clarity and consistency with other parts of the Bill.
	Amendments Nos. 48, 49 and 54 move from Part 1 to Part 2 of Schedule 10 those references to the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 and the Naval Discipline Act 1957 that were repealed by the Armed Forces Act 2006, which received Royal Assent in November last year. The repealing provisions are not yet in force; hence it is appropriate that references to them be moved from Part 1 to Part 2 of Schedule 10. I beg to move.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendments Nos. 43 to 54:
	Schedule 10 , page 183, line 7, leave out "In" and insert "For"
	Schedule 10 , page 183, line 7, leave out from "nominee)" to end of line 8 and insert "substitute—
	"(b) A person is eligible to be nominated by the Lord Chancellor under paragraph (a) or (h) of this subsection only if the person—"
	Schedule 10 , page 183, line 22, at end insert ", but as if the reference in subsection (3) of that section to section 47 of that Act were a reference to this section."
	Schedule 10 , page 183, line 22, at end insert—
	"( ) For the purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section, a person shall be taken first to become a barrister—
	(a) when the person completes pupillage in connection with becoming a barrister, or (b) in the case of a person not required to undertake pupillage in connection with becoming a barrister, when the person is called to the Bar of England and Wales."
	Schedule 10 , page 183, line 28, at end insert—
	"( ) At any time before the coming into force of section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (renaming of Supreme Court), the reference to the Senior Courts in the section 109(1)(b) substituted by sub-paragraph (2) is to be read as a reference to the Supreme Court."
	Schedule 10 , page 184, line 2, leave out sub-paragraph (2)
	Schedule 10 , page 184, line 20, leave out paragraphs 7 to 9
	Schedule 10 , page 187, line 40, at end insert—
	"( ) At any time before the coming into force of section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (renaming of Supreme Court), the references to the Senior Courts in the Schedule substituted by sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph are to be read as references to the Supreme Court."
	Schedule 10 , page 190, line 33, at end insert ", but as if the reference in subsection (3) of that section to section 47 of that Act were a reference to this section."
	Schedule 10 , page 190, line 33, at end insert—
	"( ) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) above, a person shall be taken first to become a barrister—
	(a) when the person completes pupillage in connection with becoming a barrister, or (b) in the case of a person not required to undertake pupillage in connection with becoming a barrister, when the person is called to the Bar of England and Wales."
	Schedule 10 , page 191, line 9, at end insert—
	"( ) At any time before the coming into force of section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (renaming of Supreme Court), the reference to the Senior Courts in the section 7(2)(a) substituted by sub-paragraph (3) is to be read as a reference to the Supreme Court."
	Schedule 10 , page 194, line 20, at end insert—
	" (1) In section 28(2) of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 (c. 46) (Judge Advocate of Her Majesty's Fleet)—
	(a) for paragraph (a) substitute— "(a) a person who satisfies the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 7-year basis;", and (b) in paragraphs (b) and (c), for "10" (in each place where it occurs) substitute "7".
	(2) In section 84B(2) of each of the Army Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 18) and the Air Force Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 19) (judge advocates), for paragraph (a) substitute—
	"(a) a person who satisfies the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 5-year basis;".
	(3) In section 103B(5) of each of those Acts (qualified officers in field general courts-martial), for paragraph (a) substitute—
	"(a) a person who is a barrister or solicitor in England and Wales;".
	(4) In section 53B(2) of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c. 53) (judge advocates), for paragraph (a) substitute—
	"(a) a person who satisfies the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 5-year basis;".
	(5) In relation to the enactments referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) to (4), the repealing provision is Schedule 17 to the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)."
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 48 ["Relevant qualification" in section 47: further provision]:

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: moved Amendment No. 55:
	Clause 48 , page 37, line 19, at end insert—
	"( ) At any time before the coming into force of section 59(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c. 4) (renaming of Supreme Court), the reference to the Senior Courts in subsection (11) is to be read as a reference to the Supreme Court."
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Lucas: moved Amendment No. 56:
	After Clause 53 , insert the following new Clause—
	"Enforcement by taking control of goods
	(1) There shall be a form of enforcement against corporeal moveable property for recovery of money owed that is to be known as taking control of goods.
	(2) Taking control of goods shall include selling them to recover a sum of money.
	(3) Schedule 12 shall apply where an enactment, writ or warrant confers power to take control of goods.
	(4) Regulations may make provision about taking control of goods, including provision determining the time when control is taken.
	(5) Any liability of an enforcement agent (including criminal liability) arising out of his securing goods on a highway is excluded to the extent that he acted in accordance with Schedule 12 and with reasonable care."

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for raising these issues. Perhaps I may say at this stage that I am also grateful for the helpful way in which we have debated the issues around this part of the Bill and the amount of work that the noble Lord has done on it.
	I have thought very carefully about what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve. I went back and looked at the recommendations of the Independent Review of Bailiff Law, published in 2000 by Professor Jack Beatson. On the face of it, the idea of moving this matter into regulations and being able to manoeuvre the situation in the way that the noble Lord suggests is always attractive, because that would achieve his aims and it is usually my desire to do that. But Professor Beatson's Recommendation (1)(a) struck me as vital in this context. He said that the fundamental rules governing distress should be set out in one place—in statute. Recommendation (21) set out what the methods of taking control of goods should be. We have set those out in paragraph 13 of Schedule 12. Noble Lords have generally welcomed the bringing of bailiff law together into one place.
	We had to make a decision as to whether we used primary or secondary legislation. I have talked the matter through with officials at some length over the past few days to see whether we were in the right place—and I think that we are, because it is important to bring bailiff law together on the face of legislation. That is because my objective is to clarify, rationalise and simplify enforcement agent law for all the reasons that were dealt with in Grand Committee and to bring certainty, both to professionals who deal with the law and those who are at the receiving end of it. Noble Lords will recall that we talked about all the different pieces of law—some in statute, some in common law—through which bailiff law had grown over the centuries. For that reason, I am inclined to keep it where it is—that is a key recommendation on what we should do.
	The fact that there are many regulation-making powers within the Bill does not preclude continuing to talk, not only to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and other noble Lords, but to the members of the industry with whom we have begun a dialogue, the Citizens Advice and others, about precisely how the regulation-making powers are set out. I am keen to do that over the next few months as we develop this area.
	The noble Lord was particularly concerned about those who sign a controlled goods agreement, which we talked about in Grand Committee. I made it clear then, and I reiterate again, that we are not precluding someone else signing on behalf of the debtor, provided that they have been authorised to do so. If a person volunteers to sign, it is for the enforcement agent to ascertain the relationship and to be satisfied that the debtor wants that person to sign. We will look to developing how that will look, the criteria and so on, in conjunction with those involved—both those who are concerned that someone might sign inappropriately and those who are concerned to ensure that if you are able to sign on behalf of the debtor, it is done properly. If no one is willing to claim such authority, the enforcement agency should try to contact the debtor by telephone to explain the situation and see whether they can instruct someone else to sign the agreement. If no one is willing to sign the agreement, the enforcement agency must act within its rights to take control of the goods immediately.
	Of course such an agreement should not be signed by someone who is under 18 or would not understand the nature of what they were doing and the consequences of the document that they were signing. We are going to work very carefully to make sure that we set this out properly, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is keen should be done. In the light of the principle that I have set out, and with the assurance that we will consider carefully how we do this so that we do it properly and get it right, I hope that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

Lord Lucas: My Lords, in speaking to Amendment No. 61, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 64 and 66. These amendments are designed to be helpful. My experience of the Bill has been marked from the very beginning by total confusion about the meaning of the powers it contains for taking control of goods. I am sad to say that that confusion is shared by almost everybody I have talked to. I have been in long and extensive discussions with people involved in or looking at the industry, and I have listened to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on other occasions, and the way things are set out in the Bill is unclear. If that remains the case, it will be extremely difficult for whoever regulates the industry to make sure that those who are subject to the Bill because money is being recovered from them by a bailiff understand what their situation is and what the powers of the bailiff are.
	This weighty amendment is an attempt to redraft things in a way and in an order that make the Bill, as we understand it, clear—it is quite possible that because of continued confusion we have misunderstood it. It is a plea to the Government to have this important part of the Bill set out with clarity, in clear English, in a logical order and all together, so that somebody looking at the legislation—for example, an advisor at the citizens advice bureau—can have a clear idea at first reading of whether, in particular circumstances, a bailiff is likely to be acting within the law. I have found that—and I am no lawyer, but I have been reading law, as it were, for the past 15 years in this place—extremely difficult to do with the Bill. Doubtless the noble Baroness will pick me up on some points where I have continued to misunderstand the provisions.
	I would like the noble Baroness's views on one important point of difference. At a meeting of the Enforcement Law Reform Group an issue attracted support from around the house, as it were—both from bailiffs and from the likes of the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust; t hat is, after the bailiffs have entered a house, probably peaceably, and taken control of goods, when they turn up again to deal with the matter and are refused entry they should have the power that they have currently to make a forcible entry without having to go to a court. Otherwise, their feeling was that the debtor, who at that point has refused to produce money and may well have an excess of courage and defiance to refuse them entry, would make them go through the whole business of applying to a court to get in again. Rather than that, whenever there is any doubt, they would be inclined to take the goods at first instance.
	As I said on the previous amendment, bailiffs do not wish to do that. It is good neither for them nor for the debtor that they should. So, I very much hope that the noble Baroness will confirm that the existing practice will be allowed to continue. Furthermore, I understand that that has the support not only of the bailiffs but also of those whose primary care is the debtor. I beg to move.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this. This reason for including this provision is important. We feel it is important to have the opportunity to make clear the circumstances where if one needed to use restraint, it could be used. I too have had discussions with the enforcement group about this, but I have to say that other enforcement parts of the industry, such as High Court enforcement officers, take a different view. However, I am interested in drawing this up only if there is a clear desire for us to do so and if there is agreement on how it would work. It is designed to make sure that if restraint is to be used, the circumstances for doing so are very clear. I hope he will agree that this is a positive approach.
	I understand that some elements of the enforcement industry do not want it for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, but others do. What I will commit to is that if when we have consulted on this there is a clear view that the existing powers are sufficient, I shall reconsider it. We do not have to do anything about the regulations. However, I do not want to lose the flexibility provided in the Bill to enable such a power to be taken forward if there is a clear view that this would be helpful to the industry and, indeed, to those who could be on the receiving end. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment in the knowledge that I will not do anything with it unless it becomes clear that the provision is needed.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, not just for this evening but for the way he has brought forward these issues of regulation of the industry. I hope he will agree that I have encouraged him to do so from the beginning.
	The answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan of Rogart, is that it is not always a matter of a willingness to do something, but sometimes of finding the mechanisms to do it. One of the issues has been, and continues to be, the need to ensure that the Security Industry Authority is able to regulate the industry properly, in the way that the noble Lord has said. I cannot comment on its current status; I imagine that the role it performs is a difficult one. I am quite certain, however, that we will not bring this in until we are all certain that we have got everything properly in place. I have made that commitment not only to your Lordships' House but also to the industry, which has been extremely generous—I single out Stephen Everson and Vernon Phillips, who have met me on several occasions to talk this through—and to colleagues in the Home Office, who have been very helpful.
	Before I answer specific questions, it may be helpful if I outline exactly what we have done and refer to the consultation paper Regulation of Enforcement Agents, from which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was quoting. The word "other" refers to companies, by the way. I agree that it is not very clear in the document, but it is not suggesting that we find a new gender. I too pay tribute to Ann-Marie Goddard, who has done an incredible amount of work in a very short time. I support what the noble Lord said about her work.
	Yesterday the Department for Constitutional Affairs and the Home Office issued a joint consultative partial regulatory impact assessment, with ministerial forewords signed by my honourable friend Vernon Coaker and myself, that explores the costs and impact of regulation. Much of what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, referred to is contained within that document. We have sought to set out options for the future regulation of enforcement agents, and in the document we explore three. Our preferred option is regulation by the Security Industry Authority, an agency of the Home Office, as has already been discussed at length. We have included in our list of consultees organisations that we consider will capture most, if not all, of the groups the noble Lord includes in his amendment—and, dare I say, more besides. I should point out that implementing our preferred option can be achieved through secondary legislation, using powers in the Private Security Industry Act 2001.
	After the consultation ends on 25 April 2007, and after the work that will ensue as a consequence, the Home Office will lay before the House, before the Summer Recess, the necessary affirmative order. Following the making of that order, the Home Office and the SIA will take the regulation forward towards implementation, and we will be consulting with the stakeholders. I have made sure that the wheels are in motion. The Bill currently provides an interim solution while we work towards this through the enhanced and extended certification process. I hope I have assured the noble Lord that we have found a way of doing this that uses existing legislation, but also builds on the work we have already begun with the stakeholders concerned to make sure that we get correct and appropriate regulation.
	The noble Lord asked me some specific questions. Can this license bailiffs? Yes. Are standards important? Yes. With regard to financial penalties, Section 5 of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 creates offences, the penalties for which are imprisonment, a fine or both. Are we making sure that what we are bringing in for government-employed enforcement agents is of the same standard as what already exists? Yes. I have told the industry that I am committed to ensuring that this looks like a level playing field. We recognise that the two groups are already covered in different ways, but it is important that it should feel like one industry at the end of the process, as I described.
	On the specific point about the European Convention on Human Rights, my understanding is that the Scottish system is not the same. Scotland is setting up a commission that deals with this matter differently. I will write to the noble Lord formally and address his point, so that he can make his decision about what he wishes to do further. I would say, though, that the noble Lord is referring to the consultation document. He is quite entitled to raise these issues as part of the consultation process as well, and I am sure he will. I hope he does.
	I hope noble Lords will feel that I have taken seriously the points they have raised. We have endeavoured to get the consultation document into your Lordships' hands before Report, and I have committed in Hansard to the process that will then follow, saying that the order will be laid before the Summer Recess. We are all committed to the proper regulation of bailiffs.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness who responded to my amendment with her characteristic sensitivity. I look forward to hearing about the progress that is made in her discussions with representatives of the water industry and, indeed, other utilities.
	Our intention in tabling the amendment is simply to ensure that the approach that the Government are taking is not undermined by a very simple avoidance practice. If the Government are confident that they can deal with that matter, my amendment will have served its purpose. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 87, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91 and 99.
	We had a very useful discussion on Part 6 both at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. I am extremely grateful for all the helpful comments that I received. I listened to the many concerns expressed on this matter. The following amendments are designed to meet the concerns raised on this part of the Bill.
	Amendment No. 87 amends Clause 126 to ensure that protection under these provisions will not be given to a work of art or any other object that is used to conceal contraband items so that they can be smuggled into the United Kingdom.
	Amendment No. 88 will make it a condition of approval under Clause 126 that museums and galleries must publish specified information about the objects they intend to borrow in advance of the objects coming to the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State is given power to make regulations about the publication of such information, which will specify the information which must be published, the method of publication to be adopted and how far ahead of an exhibition the information must be published. This amendment will ensure that information about the objects to be exhibited is made publicly available and will enable anyone to raise questions about their provenance before they come to the United Kingdom. Where a query is raised, it will not automatically remove protection against seizure but will allow the borrowing institution to look very carefully at the evidence before taking a final decision on whether to borrow. We intend to consult widely with those concerned, including key interest groups, before we make the regulations.
	Amendment No. 89 amends Clause 126 to give the Secretary of State power to make regulations requiring museums to provide additional information to an inquirer about an object in an exhibition and to specify the circumstances under which such information should be provided.
	The amendment ensures that the consent of Scottish and Welsh Ministers and the Department for Culture, Art and Leisure in Northern Ireland is required for any regulations made under Clause 126 and provides for the regulations to be made by statutory instrument using the negative resolution procedure.
	Amendment No. 90 inserts a new clause on relevant museums and galleries. This sets out the factors that must be considered by the relevant authority before giving approval to museums and galleries under these provisions. Museums and galleries in England must satisfy the Secretary of State that their procedures for checking the provenance and ownership of the objects they intend to borrow are satisfactory and that they comply with guidance on due diligence issued by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and the Department for Culture, Art and Leisure in Northern Ireland will be responsible for the approval of institutions within their respective territories and must apply the same factors. DCMS officials will work closely with their counterparts in those areas to ensure that we operate similar standards throughout the United Kingdom.
	Museums and galleries will be invited to apply for approval and to demonstrate through the submission of their due diligence procedures and associated documentation that they carry out very thorough checks of items they intend to borrow. Our national museums pride themselves on operating very high standards of due diligence when it comes to hosting exhibitions, and quite rightly so.
	This amendment will ensure that approved museums comply with guidance about due diligence procedures issued by the Secretary of State and makes it clear that approval may be withdrawn if it becomes apparent that a museum is not maintaining sufficiently high standards of due diligence. Where approval is withdrawn from an institution, it will not immediately affect the protected objects which will continue to enjoy immunity from seizure until the end of the exhibition. Museums that have had their approved status withdrawn will therefore not be able to offer immunity in relation to any subsequent exhibition but will be able to reapply and will need to satisfy the Secretary of State that their standards have improved to an acceptable level before approval is granted again.
	Amendment No. 91 removes subsection (3) in Clause 128 which defines approved institutions. This is replaced by the new clause after Clause 127.
	Finally, Amendment No. 99 amends Clause 139 to allow the provisions on immunity from seizure to be brought into force by order rather than automatically two months after Royal Assent. This is to allow time for detailed consultations on the regulations on the publication of information about protected items, which must be made before the immunity is brought into force. I beg to move.

Lord Maclennan of Rogart: My Lords, I express the strong gratitude of these Benches for the work that the Government have done to meet the concerns expressed on Second Reading about the possible impact of the understandable wish to meet the desires of museums and galleries to continue short-term loans while taking all possible steps to protect the interests of those who might have an interest in art which has been the subject of spoliation.
	It is not, of course, possible for one country or one government wholly to deal with what is essentially an international problem. I hope that the Government will think it right to raise these matters in an international forum, probably UNESCO. Similar publications to those proposed in the very useful Amendments Nos. 87 through to 89 would carry even greater clout if they were replicated on a wider stage.
	The Government have responded magnificently to the representations which were received and have sought all practical ways of dealing with a difficult problem.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick: My Lords, I, too, wish to say a few words on these amendments. This part of the Bill is concerned with the problem of looted art, although that phrase is not used in the Bill. However, I think that we all know what it means. The purpose of this part is to protect museums and galleries that wish to exhibit foreign works of art which may have been looted. Obviously, they do not wish to be involved in expensive legal proceedings. The pressure for this part of the Bill comes from them. One can see their point, especially as this matter involves a departure from the ordinary rules of English law.
	But there is another side to the matter—those who claim to be the owners of the works of art in question. The last thing they want is for the works of art that they claim to be theirs to be exhibited in this country, and that exhibition to be used as a shop window for the sale of what they claim to be their works of art. As I understand it, there would be no way in which such a sale could be prevented.
	The purpose of the amendments, which is very beneficial, is to give some assurance to such people. My only suggestion, in welcoming the amendments, would be that the amendments might go a little further, and that when the regulations are made there should be a specific regulation that the protection will not be afforded to works of art coming to this country about which there is reasonable ground to believe they may have been looted. I am told—this point was made to me by someone who has made a considerable study of this subject and has had some personal experience—that that is the equivalent provision in the comparable German legislation. I just hope that when the regulations are made there could be some provision to that effect, to give further protection to the claimants.

Lord Howarth of Newport: My Lords, I add my expression of appreciation to my noble friend for all the care that she has taken to reconcile the variety of reasonable and proper requirements that the Government have sought to meet in this legislation. She has proceeded with great sensitivity, and the amendments are thoroughly constructive and are to be welcomed. Amendments Nos. 88 and 89 would allow the Secretary of State to introduce a system of discretionary immunity from seizure, as opposed to the system of automatic immunity that the museums and galleries originally asked for, and which was provided for in the Bill until these amendments were tabled. The Secretary of State could require institutions to publish in advance a list of objects that they proposed to borrow from abroad to exhibit in this country. That would bring us into line with legislation and practice in numerous other jurisdictions, including Switzerland, where most recently anti-seizure legislation was enacted.
	The benefits would be that a discretionary system would allow someone to make an objection, in advance of the exhibition, about the inclusion of an item that was considered inappropriate to be exhibited because of dubiety concerning its legal and ethical status. To that extent, it makes it less likely that exhibitions in this country would be tainted by the presence of objects whose provenance and ownership was unsound. It would perhaps enable a claimant to identify the whereabouts of an object that had been lost sight of and the location of which the claimant no longer knew. On the other side of the fence, it would alert a lending institution to the risk that an action might be brought to make a claim to such property, and to that extent it may discourage lenders from lending.
	I cannot see that the provision would improve the prospect of a claimant achieving satisfaction in the UK courts, unless of course the claimant refrained from raising an objection when the list was published. But there is a wider moral point—it was powerfully expressed by my noble friend Lord Janner, as always, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick—that it is simply indecent that stolen art should be paraded in exhibitions around the world.
	The objection to advertising an intention to borrow particular cultural objects and to particularise them in a list was made by museums and galleries that were worried about the administrative complexity and the cost of the procedure. Would there be any significant increase in complexity and cost for museums and galleries if they were practising due diligence with the thoroughness that the Government already specify in guidance? I think not. I would go further and say that the publication of a list of cultural objects that they are minded to borrow, with the invitation for people to comment, should be seen as an aspect of due diligence and as an enhancement of the process.
	It would be useful if a borrowing institution that perhaps is otherwise not very well placed—whether due to a lack of resources or a lack of availability of relevant documentation—to conduct the research that due diligence requires, and thereby is perhaps excessively reliant on the information provided by the lending institution, had available to it new sources of information that arose because of the consultation process.
	Trustees and staff of museums and galleries are, almost by definition, civilised people, but it is not their duty solely to promote appreciation of art; they ought to be good citizens and they should be anxious to adopt procedures that guarantee that they will not breach propriety and they should be willing to support their fellow citizens in having access to justice. That is the spirit in which Sir Nicholas Serota and the committee that he chairs under the auspices of the National Museum Directors' Conference has proceeded under several years past—and that should be recognised. So I hope that museums and galleries will accept these amendments without demur.
	I have one question for the Minister about Amendment No. 89, which is permissive only. It states:
	"The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring a museum or gallery to provide ... specified information about an object".
	May we take it that it is the intention of the Secretary of State and of the other UK authorities to introduce such regulations and is my noble friend able to give the House any inkling of what they might provide? I ask that particularly in relation to timescale. How far in advance will museums and galleries have to publish the details of their intended borrowing? It is generally agreed that the provision in Switzerland that 30 days' notice should be given is, in practice, too short; it does not allow people who are likely to be working across international frontiers to have the time they need to investigate the status of an object, take the advice that they require and then to register their objections. On the other hand, we should not prolong that process beyond what is genuinely reasonably necessary, because lead times for the organising of great international exhibitions are formidably long and, for entirely understandable reasons, agreements on the loan of some items are often reached at a late stage. I have noted that my noble friend said that the department would consult museums and galleries on this matter. Will the department consider also publishing the regulations in draft, so that there can be wider consideration of them before they are enacted?
	Amendment No. 90 would introduce a new clause that would elaborate on the face of the Bill the Government's requirements in respect of due diligence. I suspect that the amendment is technically unnecessary, but it is helpful that the language of the legislation should be made plainer and the policy clearer to those who are not specialists in this field. It is right that the Government should be required not just to consider the declared procedures of an institution in carrying out due diligence to establish provenance and ownership, but they should also ensure that those procedures are more than notional. Therefore, it is right that the Secretary of State should be required to satisfy herself as to their compliance with the best practice guidelines that she publishes.
	Will the Minister say something about how the department will monitor that compliance and will she clarify some elements in the current guidance, Combating Illicit Trade? At section 3, it is roundly stated:
	"Museums should acquire and borrow items only if they are legally and ethically sound".
	Can my noble friend either now or, perhaps more likely through one of her ministerial colleagues at the DCMS in due course, cast light on some illustrative cases? I understand that the Government's position is that although objects that were wrongfully taken in the Nazi era may be protected in their present ownership by the expiry of limitation periods, they remain ethically unsound and should not be acquired or borrowed by public collections in this country. Is it similarly the Government's view that objects that were forcibly expropriated without compensation, for example by the Bolsheviks, are protected in their present ownership by sovereign immunity, but also remain ethically unsound and should not be borrowed for exhibitions in this country? What is the Government's view—

Lord Howarth of Newport: My Lords, I take the admonition of my noble friend. I am endeavouring to speak to the amendments and it is not unimportant that Parliament should be seen to have scrutinised this legislation; but I certainly appreciate the force of what he said.
	Do the Government consider that an institution should not be able to borrow objects that were taken at one time by Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan and are now claimed by the People's Republic of China as its property? What would be the view of the Government in monitoring compliance as to the propriety of an institution seeking such loans from St Petersburg or Taipei? In what respect does this anti-seizure legislation alter the position that applied previously? These are real and pertinent questions of genuine concern to important institutions in this country that will want to know the answers; I hope that the Minister will advise us on these matters in due course.
	Finally, I wish to ask the Minister about subsection (3) of Amendment No. 90. Why is the power made discretionary regarding the withdrawal of approval where the Government consider that the,
	"institutions' procedures for establishing provenance or ownership of objects are inadequate"?
	Is it not the case that sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander? Why should not the rigour that the department enjoins on museums and galleries be applied to itself? If an institution falls short in its practice of due diligence, perhaps the Secretary of State should have a duty to withdraw approval. Why is "may", rather than "must", written into this amendment? Is it to protect the Secretary of State from the possibility of a suit on the part of a frustrated claimant? If so, is that a good enough reason? Are the Government willing to consider amending this amendment at Third Reading by substituting "must" for "may"?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken and for the general welcome that has been given to these amendments. I pay tribute to the officials at the Department for Culture, Media and Sport who have been nothing short of magnificent in helping me to sort out the amendments; noble Lords will know that I am not an expert on art or on the workings of that department, so I am grateful to my honourable friend David Lammy who has been extremely supportive and who has met a number of organisations.
	I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, that we should be keen to talk to our international partners and colleagues about what we have done in this legislation and I agree with what he said about clout being important in this context. Overall, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, on the powerful moral point that lay behind many of the discussions that we had at Second Reading and in Grand Committee and I hope—in fact, I know—that noble Lords will feel that what we have brought forward attempts to deal with that, while recognising that, sadly, there are issues that we cannot deal with in the way that we would like to.
	I am grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Janner. I confirm that the standards will be met in the way that my noble friend asked, and I will look at the whole question of legal proceedings. We will give serious consideration to the point that was made about helping claimants to pursue claims in other jurisdictions. We appreciate how difficult that can be and we will certainly explore whether it would be possible to make other information available for that purpose.
	The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, asked about the protection that should not be afforded to works of art that we have reasonable grounds to believe are looted. All major museums in this country accept that works of art that have been looted should not be exhibited and it is not the intention of these provisions to enable them to do so. Approval of museums will be dependent on their demonstrating that they have due diligence procedures that will ensure that, when objects are borrowed, there is an appropriate way to take this forward. Publication of information about objects will, we hope, provide a further safeguard, enabling concerns about particular objects to be raised and ensuring that objects identified as looted are not exhibited.
	My noble friend Lord Howarth raised a series of issues. I met my noble friend in the hope that I might have been able to tackle some of these issues. I apologise that, inevitably, I do not have the detail at my fingertips. I will try to deal with as many of the issues as I can, with the promise of writing to my noble friend and placing a copy in the Library.
	We have considered the different forms of community legislation adopted in other countries. In particular, we considered whether a discretionary system such as that in Switzerland, which requires museums to submit an application for each exhibition, would provide sufficient benefits to outweigh the costs and concluded that it would not. The major benefits can be achieved by requiring museums to publish information about each object, as we propose. We think that that would be a better way forward. We intend to publish regulations and will be discussing what the appropriate timescale for publication should be both with interest groups and with museums and galleries. We are currently considering requiring publication of information two months before the start of an exhibition. We will refine that in consultation, if it is required.
	We appreciate that undertaking due diligence investigations into the provenance and ownership of cultural objects that the museum wishes to borrow will require museums to devote resources to this. As my noble friend says, our museums have already committed themselves to this by accepting the guidance on due diligence issued by the department and endorsed by the Museums Association and other professional bodies. It may be the case that some museums feel that they do not have the resources to meet the standards. No museum is obliged to apply for approval for the purpose of the amenity; it is up to the museum to decide how to spend its resources.
	My noble friend asked whether the museums and galleries would be consulted on the content of regulations and whether draft regulations would be published. We will be consulting museums, galleries and interest groups on the detailed content of our regulations and they will be shown drafts of the regulations. No final decision has been taken over a formal publication of the draft.
	As for objects appropriated without compensation in, for example, the Russian Revolution—my noble friend gave other examples—these are quite difficult questions. I know that he intends for me to write to him or for my colleagues to do so. I will ensure that that happens and that, as I indicated, copies are placed in the Library of the House.
	My noble friend also asked how compliance with due diligence guidance will be monitored. Museums will be required to submit detailed information on their procedures, including how they will investigate provenance and ownership of the objects that they propose to borrow and how these procedures are operated in practice. They will be expected to apply the DCMS guidance and they will be subject to a programme of spot checks to make sure that that is actually happening.
	Finally, Amendment No. 90 would change "may" to "must" to oblige the authority to withdraw approval. We do not think that that is appropriate, because the approving authority would have to consider all the circumstances. It may be the case that official failure has been immediately rectified by the museum concerned and we think that it would be unjust to have mandatory withdrawal. But I say that within the context that, if museums do not do this, approval would be withdrawn without question.

The Lord Bishop of Winchester: My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, in congratulating and thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, for bringing forward tonight's debate. It is a most important subject, and her three points were much to the point.
	I speak as a layman from a medical point of view but, granted my memory of recent debates in your Lordships' House on these matters, it is worth saying that I also speak as a member, for nearly 40 years, of a profession with many centuries of experience in the care of, presence with and attention to people who are very ill or approaching death. A palliative care service is effective which makes available to anyone in need of it, and especially to the less autonomous and more vulnerable, the highest quality of scientific, medical and nursing care and a most generous service of time, love, touch, presence, respect and reassurance. They all need to be informed by an excellent understanding of the spiritual, psychiatric and social needs of people who are chronically or terminally ill and their families. Then, whatever the extent of people's suffering, whether physical, mental or spiritual, they can approach their death with as little pain as is safe—loved, cared for and feeling safe and not alone.
	Noble Lords will notice that I made none of the overstated claims to which the noble Baroness correctly made critical reference. I am not arguing that the effectiveness of palliative care services should not be rigorously assessed and evaluated, but I suggest that in this field, as in many others, there is much that is real, true, describable and important, but not, in the end, measurable. On what basis should the Government fund additional services? They should fund additional services so that that quality palliative care is consistently and generally available to those who need it.
	I should add in response to what was said by the noble Baroness this evening and by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in the debate last week—at which I was unable to be present, but which I read—that I shall continue to judge that some choices should remain not open to me, including, as the noble Baroness put it, the choice of when to die.

Baroness Greengross: My Lords, I recognise the excellent record that we have in this country in the development of palliative care, and the high level of skill and competence of specialist doctors and nurses in this important branch of medicine. It is recognised that care goes on being very important when cure is no longer a realistic option.
	It is important that we recognise that the end of life is a very important phase—as important as any other in our lives. Many people are very much more frightened of the process of dying than the thought of being dead. We must understand that that phase is not just a problem that requires a solution but one that needs to be approached in the same way as other major life episodes. We must assume that people have the same rights and capacity to make decisions about their care until they take their last breath.
	We all have an ideal view of the perfect, trouble-free death, but we know that people often experience many difficulties, not least of which, as has been mentioned by my noble friend Lady Murphy, is the extreme pain and discomfort that some experience. Other considerations include communicating their wishes. At times, family members may be very unhappy with those wishes. When pain can no longer be controlled, we know that many have reached the critical point where they are incapable of exercising any choice because progressive sedation will have rendered them unconscious.
	I therefore very much welcome the end-of-life care strategy, which emphasises the need for individuals to exercise choice until the very end. It states that,
	"for most individuals it may be more important to ensure that the care delivered is in accordance with their preferences, rather than to have it delivered in the care setting of their choice".
	The figures show us that only 4 per cent of deaths occur in hospices, and that we need to extend hospice provision in hospitals, in which 57 per cent of deaths and more than half of all deaths involving cancer occur. Most people express a preference for dying in their own home. Yet both in hospitals and at home, patients may not receive the specialist pain management or the total care that they need.
	I hope that the Government will, through this very welcome end-of-life strategy, make available much more palliative care, including adequate pain relief, in suitable and comfortable environments with adequate privacy for all of us if and when we need it, and make pain relief a reality for all who want and need it in accordance with their wishes. Whether that pain relief lengthens or shortens the very end of the time they have on this Earth, it assures that their choice, their wishes and their comfort are always paramount when the last decisions about their lives are taken.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: My Lords, I am grateful for an opportunity to debate palliative care. I cannot possibly refute all the misconceptions in the short time that I have been allocated to speak, but I shall do my best. It was Dame Cicely Saunders who, from the outset, sought evidence for her work more than 40 years ago. She started outside the NHS because she knew that change would be faster. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, that change has not been fast enough; it has not been fast enough for many of us. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, sought evidence, and I will try to give her some.
	Early research into morphine revolutionised pain control, and we have led the world in that research. Morphine does not shorten life when used for symptom control. The good news is that a paper is in press at the moment on this very subject, the literature from around the world having been reviewed. There is no such thing as the so-called double effect that shortens people's lives. People are dying of their disease, although some people are ignorant of how to use morphine properly. Education is the answer to that; it is needed.
	Research is being conducted into the 5 per cent of residual, neuropathic, difficult pains, and we are exploring the use of cheaper drugs such as methadone. However, many of these studies have been done on a shoestring in services that were completely outside the NHS, although fortunately the Government have now started the National Cancer Research Institute, which is at last promoting research into palliative care across all groups in the drive to find better ways to relieve distress, wherever the patient is.
	It was Cicely Saunders who spoke of total pain—pain that is real and has a physical cause. That pain is made much worse by emotional, social and spiritual factors that can overwhelm the patient. I will tell noble Lords very briefly about one young woman whose pain seemed uncontrollable. She needed so much morphine at night that she was sedated through the day. In the evening, however, her pain returned. I spent not minutes but hours with her. She told me that her 11 year-old was going to be left orphaned. She was a single parent, and she was so worried about the pain that her death would inflict on him. We spoke about how to plan for his care, involved a solicitor, and helped to make plans for how to tell him what was happening to Mum. At 11 pm that night, I returned to the hospital, having been out at a dinner, because I had promised her that I would come back. I tucked her in in the same way in which I would tuck in my own daughter. That was the first night that she slept, because it had been the spiritual and emotional conflicts that had been tearing her apart. The morphine was actually controlling her physical pain well. Noble Lords should remember that palliative care was developed, and by and large remains, outside the NHS, even today. It continues to search for better ways to care and to influence providers.
	What about patient autonomy? The whole philosophy is about the impeccable attention to detail, to which noble Lords have already alluded. What can the patient achieve within the boundaries now set by the horizons that are shrinking because of disease? That is a reality of life; horizons also shrink with age and with all the infirmities that come along. We have heard only too recently about the vulnerability of the elderly, who are worried about their finances being raided by people whom they trusted and who they thought loved them.
	In 2000-01, Professor Irene Higginson and I undertook a systematic review of the efficacy of palliative care teams, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, alluded. Overall, we found beneficial effects on pain and other symptoms, on home deaths and on carer satisfaction. The beneficial effect on pain and other symptoms was striking, and no study showed an overall adverse outcome. This evidence went on to underpin the NICE guidance on palliative care service configuration. The noble Lord, Lord MacKenzie of Culkein, is absolutely right; attitude and a flexible approach are all. What makes a difference to patients is people being prepared to work outside the boundaries of their indemnity, and so on, to provide what a patient needs. It is misleading to think of palliative care as simply a death-bed science. If it were, the randomised control trials that have been alluded to might be an appropriate research tool. Qualitative methods have evolved in palliative care in particular to try to capture the reality of those subtle, difficult moments that patients and their families experience, and to try to see whether we have made a difference.
	Earlier referral to palliative care has proven benefits in improving symptoms and preventing their escalation. Qualitative data back this up, showing benefits to how people are thinking, feeling and coping. Cost savings have also been demonstrated both in the hospital stay-time and in the drugs used. But what about everyday practice? Yesterday, I thought I had better check how my own team in the cancer centre in which I work is doing, so I looked at our audit data. Our routinely collected audit data, collected mostly by a specialist nurse, have shown that 80 per cent of the patients have improved symptom and distress scores within 48 to 72 hours of being seen. You might say that 80 per cent is far too little. I would, but I am a realist and I know that nothing has a 100 per cent success rate in medicine, certainly not first time. Indeed, palliative care has never claimed to be the universal panacea or a magic wand to relieve the suffering that we see day in, day out, and to take it all away.
	The point is that specialist palliative care aims to get people home again as quickly as possible, to carry on living as well as possible for as long as possible, however long that may be. Sometimes it is for months, and sometimes, surprisingly, it is for years. Palliative care must be improved across the board, and no one can predict what the future holds.
	I ask noble Lords to allow me another minute of indulgence to say a little more. I would like to talk about my mother, who just over a year ago could not be moved in bed without screaming out in pain. It was a nightmare transferring her into the hospice, where in fact she lay for many weeks. Everyone, including my mother, believed that she was dying. She wanted to die. The noble Lord, Lord Joffe, may be pleased to know that she told me that she would have gone for assisted suicide if his Bill had been in place. This went on for about three weeks. I will fast-forward to her birthday, which was this January. She is up and about, living actively. This morning, she spoke to her philosophy class on the meaning of hope. The one thing that she does not do now is drive. She was never a good driver, so we are all relieved. She said that she never believed that her life could have so much quality. Sometimes, those conversations, with her suffering so much, tested me to the limit.
	We are trying to roll out to the generalists the lessons that we learn from specialist palliative care. The National Council for Palliative Care is working on the needs of those with dementia, neurological disease, and cardio-respiratory disease. Work on motor neurone disease has shown that patients do not choke to death. The Liverpool Care Pathway has shown that we can roll out good anticipatory care to ensure patients have a calm and dignified death wherever they are. The wish to die at home, as expressed by two-thirds of patients, can be realised. Hospice of the Valleys has a 69 per cent home death rate. The needs assessment to underpin commissioning decisions that have been alluded to in this debate has been undertaken. The national strategy for end-of-life care brings us hope—

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this excellent debate, and particularly my noble friend Lady Jay. She is of course a distinguished predecessor of mine at the Department of Health and was deeply involved in laying the foundations of the improvements that we have seen come through in the National Health Service. It is a delight for me to respond to her tonight. I start by declaring an interest as a financial supporter of St Mary's Hospice, Birmingham.
	This has been an interesting debate and there has not always been agreement on some of the fundamental issues we are considering here. However, all noble Lords agree that more money should be put into palliative care and I shall certainly respond to that in a moment. But I agree strongly with the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, about the critical importance of this part of a person's life and our need to ensure that it is given adequate priority. That is a sentiment with which all noble Lords will agree.
	I turn to the question of the definition of palliative care. My noble friend Lady Jay made some interesting observations about the scope and remit of palliative care and discussed what she described as a contemporary definition, and indeed the philosophy and practice of some palliative care practitioners. These are searching questions and I have no glib response to make, but it is important to ensure that there is continuing debate about these matters. The right reverend Prelate offered his own definition of palliative care, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, and we were treated by the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, to a quote from the NICE definition. I am sure that when we come to debate the Bill of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, in two and a half weeks' time we will again enjoy a discussion of this area, particularly the question of the extent to which palliative care embraces social and spiritual elements. Again, sharply contrasting points of view have been expressed on this in the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, spoke of the inevitable links between physical pain and its social and mental impact.
	I shall turn to the end of life care strategy in a moment. It will attempt to draw up a definition of palliative care and I will ensure that tonight's debate is drawn to the attention of the group of people working to address the definition. I think noble Lords will agree that one would not envy those charged with this task, but alongside dealing with the definition they are also helping to develop a strategy that will measure quality of care, including outcomes. I shall also come back to the issue of research later in my response.
	My noble friend Lady Jay pleaded the case of the need for evidence-based research, and a number of other noble Lords echoed that request. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, talked about some of the challenges faced in doing that and the contrast in outcomes of specialist care and non-specialist care, on which there does seem to be general agreement. She also spoke of the need for openness and honesty about the clinical experience and the wishes of patients. We were also treated to a number of examples of the kind of research that has been undertaken. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred to some of those research aspects which have shown proven benefits, including what she described as "thinking, feeling and coping". The noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, commented on some of the challenges faced by researchers and the inevitability, as she described it, of some research having to be focused on quality of care.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, outlined, I understand the concerns expressed about the availability of funding for research in this area historically, but the intention of the National Cancer Research Institute is an investment of £5 million in palliative care research over a five-year period. Tonight's debate will be helpful in ensuring that the parameters of that research take into account some of the interesting, difficult and in effect conflicting views expressed about what kinds of research should be undertaken.
	So far as effectiveness is concerned, primary care trusts have local responsibility for commissioning and funding services for their resident population, including palliative care. One of those responsibilities is for PCTs to decide upon and take forward a strategy and commission the appropriate services. In doing so, they must ensure that evidence is available about the potential effectiveness of those services. I suspect that noble Lords will say to me that primary care trusts need a lot of help in determining how to judge effectiveness. One of the conclusions I reach on that is that we must ensure that such research looks at the very practical issues facing individual primary care trusts up and down the land.
	I turn now to the end-of-life care strategy. As noble Lords have said, work in this area is being led by Professor Mike Richards, the National Cancer Director, with support from Professor Ian Philp, the National Director for Older People's Services and Neurological Conditions, and other national clinical directors. I can assure noble Lords that the work will go much wider cancer; this is an end-of-life care strategy for all people and all categories of care.
	The strategy is concerned with delivering increased choice to all patients, regardless of their condition, within available resources. I noted with great care what my noble friend Lady Jay said about choice and the need to work with representatives of patients' interests. I shall certainly ensure that that happens. I take account of the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, about the lack of consistency in relation to choice—she is right to raise the issue—and about how patients and relatives can be helped to exercise choice. Again, I agree with her and I will ensure that that is a factor of the work that is to be undertaken.
	As to her point about Compass, in the time available I have not been able to obtain further information. I shall look at the matter, write to her and let her know what the current position is.
	The strategy will build on the programme of action set out in the White Paper Our Health, Our Care, Our Say. Some of its key points concern the need to improve the co-ordination of end-of-life care through effective partnerships between health services, social services and the voluntary sector. I hope my noble friend Lord MacKenzie will take some comfort from that because I certainly agree that it would be ludicrous if agency barriers got in the way of an integrated approach. Palliative care must lend itself to partnerships, and we want to ensure that the incentives are all there to encourage such partnerships.
	We also want to ensure that we provide rapid and responsive services to meet patients' needs and preferences and, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, to train healthcare professionals in all settings. I agree with the point that she raised.
	So far, an extensive written consultation has been conducted and 170 responses have been received; a major consultation conference was held last October and feedback has been helpful in suggesting the direction of travel; and an advisory board, appointed by Ministers and supported by several expert working groups, will be taking forward various developments in the strategy. I will ensure that the advisory board and Professor Richards and his colleagues are given a full account of today's debate. The advisory board is expected to report to Ministers with recommendations in the autumn of this year.
	One of the working groups is examining the potential of end-of-life care in a variety of settings, a point well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and other noble Lords. At present, around 55 per cent of deaths occur in hospital, around 20 per cent at home, around 20 per cent in care homes—and we must not forget care homes, although they have not been mentioned today—and around 4 per cent in hospices. Clearly the challenge is to ensure that good quality palliative care is available in all those settings. This strategy is our best shot at setting a framework and objectives to ensure that that happens.
	I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, about the need to expand palliative care and what he said about pain-relief services. I expect the strategy to address those issues.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, asked some searching questions about the current availability of palliative services in the NHS. There is a considerable variation in the availability of those services and the aim of the strategy is to get a more consistent approach.
	I turn now to the issue of resources. I remember four or five years ago taking part in a debate on the question of resources which was opened by the noble Lord, Lord Walker of Worcester. I echo the remarks of my noble friend Lord MacKenzie about the hugely impressive contribution that hospices have made and the tremendous efforts that they have made and are making to raise funds. I understand a little of the challenges they face and the competition from many other charities. They have done tremendously well and the Government do not take a cynical approach to them.
	The responsibility for making decisions has to lie with the primary care trusts. Equally, we have a responsibility for setting a framework and a strategy within which primary care trusts can make those decisions. I accept that the deficits with which the NHS has found itself this year have caused PCTs to make some very difficult decisions. I do not run away from that. We had to deal with the deficits—they could not be allowed to go on—and that is why this short-term action has had to be taken. I am absolutely convinced that we need to do everything we can to give long-term certainty to hospices and I hope that the strategy will help us to do that.
	I know that funding from the NHS is not as much as noble Lords want but the Help the Hospices survey showed that, compared with 2000, in 2004 there had been an increase in NHS funding for adult hospices of about 50 per cent, with NHS funding for adult hospices averaging about 38 per cent of expenditure. There are other things I could say about funding, and other initiatives, but time is against me. The issue of funding will of course be addressed in the end-of-life strategy, but difficult decisions will always have to be made.
	Children's palliative care is embraced within the work we set out in the White Paper, Our Health, Our Care, Our Say. That requires primary care trusts to ensure that the right model of care is provided, and we will work to support them in that.
	I pay tribute to the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and the St John's hospice at home project. My noble friend Lord McKenzie echoed the noble Viscount's remarks. Many hospices have done valuable work in developing hospice care with staff in the patient's home. We endorse that, and wish to see it developed further.
	This has been an interesting debate. We have heard very different views on the nature and scope of palliative care. I suspect we will have further opportunities to discuss that in your Lordships' House in the next few months., while I doubt whether the end-of-life strategy will be able to provide a definitive answer to some of those questions, it will set out a much stronger framework in which to deliver a much more consistent approach to palliative care services. Tonight's debate has been very helpful in informing the people developing the strategy of some of the important matters they need to take account of.